We construct comprehensive and consistent datasets on telecommunications and electricity regulations in developing countries through extensive surveys of regulators. The database of telecommunications regulations includes 178 variables on regulatory governance and content in 45 countries. The database of electricity regulations includes 374 variables in 20 countries. This paper motivates the data collection exercise, explains the survey design, and provides a few examples of the types of information and results the data can yield. The appendix provides links to the freely available datasets and codebooks.
Introduction
Infrastructure industries including telecommunications, electricity, water, and gas underwent massive structural changes during the 1990s. During that decade, hundreds of privatization transactions valued at billions of dollars were completed in these sectors in developing and transitional economies, or DTEs (Table 1) . While privatization has received the most attention in both the popular and academic literature, reforms have involved more than just privatization. They have also included market liberalization, structural changes like unbundling, and the introduction of new laws and regulations. Until recently, infrastructure sectors were generally considered "natural monopolies," meaning that people believed that a single firm could provide service at the lowest cost. As a result, most countries restricted entry, allowing single firms, which were usually stateowned, to provide service in each industry.
1 Even after technological progress made the natural monopoly argument less tenable -especially in the telecommunications sectorthese firms typically retained a dominant, and often monopoly, position in most countries.
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Privatization therefore meant creating a private firm capable of exercising significant market power. In other words, even when competition was feasible, the presence of a dominant firm often made its introduction difficult. Regulatory agencies and regulations thus became an integral component of reform as a means of protecting consumers, reassuring investors, and, presumably, helping to advance competition. 2 Nonetheless, in developing countries the design of regulatory policies and structures to govern infrastructure industries after privatization was often given relatively little attention compared to privatization itself (see Kessides, 2004 , for a comprehensive overview of regulation in DTEs). Several factors may help explain the relatively low weight given to regulation. First, fiscal crises often motivated reforms, making many believe that it was important to privatize quickly. 3 While privatization transactions are by no means simple, they are in many respects more straightforward than designing regulations and regulatory agencies. Speed thus meant privatizing first and worrying about regulation later. 4 Second, there was concern that regulatory agencies would simply become a new mechanism through which the state could interfere with the market. 5 Finally, industrialized countries were beginning to realize the costs of regulation and were rapidly deregulating industries where there appeared to be little economic reason for it (Winston, 1993) . In that context it could have seemed somewhat hypocritical to advocate new regulatory authorities in transition and developing countries while dismantling them in industrialized countries. Just as designing and implementing regulation was subordinate to the privatization itself, empirical research has also focused far more heavily on privatization than it has on regulation. While some case studies have explored regulation in developing countries, most cross-country empirical work has involved little more than including a dummy variable indicating the presence of a regulator (and perhaps whether the regulator is, in theory, "independent") in a reduced-form regression.
However, regulations, regulators, regulated industries, and politics interact in complicated ways that affect the development of the industry as well as the rest of the economy. The importance of these interactions has long been recognized and debated in the United States -the country with the most experience dealing with private (monopoly) utilities. Indeed, well before privatization became a worldwide phenomenon an extensive body of literature on regulation had developed in the US (see, for example, Baron, 1989; Braeutigam, 1989; Noll, 1989; Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971) .
One reason for the vast body of literature on regulation in industrialized countries is the sea of data generated as a byproduct of the interaction of regulatory agencies and regulated firms. Likewise, the main reason for the paucity of empirical work on regulation in developing countries has been the lack of data, which has prevented researchers from exploring regulation in any detail. Our survey of telecommunications and electricity regulators is an attempt to begin to fill this gap by providing systematic data to inform empirical analysis. The survey yields a large dataset that should help promote understanding of regulatory institutions as they actually function and how they interact with the industry and economy.
We are not the first to survey regulators. NERA (1997) conducted surveys of selected infrastructure utility regulators in six countries. 6 The 12 surveys elicited responses that NERA then interpreted and graded, providing a kind of "scorecard" of regulators. While among the first of its kind, the information gathered tended to be verbal responses rather than data that could easily be compared. And because the 12 surveys were spread over many industries and few countries, the effort generated valuable information, especially for case studies, but not enough to be used for cross-country or cross-industry empirical analysis. 7 We designed our surveys explicitly to generate data that can inform such empirical work.
communications -a proposal that sounds remarkably like centralized planning and optimization (Larina, 2001 ). 6 NERA's (1997) survey covered electricity, gas, telecoms, transport, and water in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines. They did not cover all industries in all countries, so the total number of surveys was 12. 7 Electricity was the best covered, with four regulatory agencies included. The others each had two. Three regulators were surveyed in India and Malaysia, two in Indonesia and the Philippines, and one each in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Survey design
As discussed above, empirical research on infrastructure reforms in developing countries has largely ignored the role of regulation. Moreover, the few papers that have explored regulation have not gone much deeper than controlling for whether a regulatory agency exists, and perhaps whether it is considered "independent." Our survey effort is an attempt to produce data that will allow empirical researchers to explore regulations and regulatory agencies in far more depth than has generally been possible to date. In this section we explain the general framework for designing the surveys. In the following two sections we provide some specific details regarding the telecommunications and electricity surveys, respectively. For analytical purposes, regulations can usefully be broken down into governance and content (Levy and Spiller, 1994) . Governance includes the structures that determine whether those incentives are credible and sustainable. In other words, governance includes rules that order the scope, configuration, and process of regulatory decision-making and the organization and procedures of regulatory agencies (for example, Levy and Spiller, 1996; Williamson, 1996) . Content includes the specific laws and policies towards pricing, competition, access, and investment that shape incentives facing firms and consumers.
We designed the surveys to capture the large variance in both governance and content. Even basic ideas regarding what is considered important for effective regulatory agencies can take many forms and be subtly different across regulators. For example, it has become almost an article of faith among advisers to developing countries that in order to be effective a regulator must be independent from short-term political pressure. The small amount of empirical research that has investigated the issue typically uses a dummy variable to indicate whether or not a regulator is independent.
8 Such an approach may be a reasonable first step for empirical research, especially when that dummy variable was the only extant empirical data, but characterizing a regulatory agency as either independent or not independent is unrealistic. No government agency is (or probably should be) completely independent, and can be more or less independent across a wide range of issues.
Thus, rather than ask whether a regulator is independent, we instead ask many objective questions that can help determine how independent a regulator is in different areas. So, for example, among other questions that might be relevant for independence, the survey asks how much of a regulator's budget comes from industries' fees, government appropriations, donors, and other sources; under what circumstances a regulator can be fired; and whether the country's chief executive (president or prime minister) can veto regulatory decisions. Moreover, governance does not end with independence: accountability, transparency, capacity, and competency are also likely to be important features (see, for example, Noll, 2000). The surveys contain numerous measures of these criteria, as well. This approach allows researchers to gain a better understanding of the 8 See, for example, Baudrier (2001) or Wallsten (2001; 2002) . Interestingly, none of these papers finds unambiguously positive effects of independence on sector performance, and finds some evidence of negative effects. These results could be because independence, in fact, is not good for development of the sector, because the regulator dummy variable is likely to be endogenous but is not treated that way in the regressions, because a dummy variable is an unsatisfactory measure of independence, or because independence is only one of many features of governance that work together as a system of checks and balances. The questions raised by these results highlight the need both for more empirical work on regulation and the data to do that work.
nuanced ways in which regulators may or may not be "independent" and how those ways may interact with other governance features (see, for example, Haggarty, Shirley, and Wallsten (2003) who use the telecommunications dataset to explore the extent to which countries meet these criteria and why they may exist in some countries but not others).
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Country selection
Our intention was to survey all telecommunications and electricity regulators that were operating in developing countries in 2001. We first identified every developing country that seemed to have a regulatory agency with an email address or fax number. We sent the survey via email, fax, and regular mail to those agencies, and followed up with telephone calls. As is made clear below, we had more success with telecommunications regulators than with electricity regulators. This difference in response rates largely reflects the more advanced state of reforms in telecommunications compared to electricity.
The survey of telecommunications regulators
Between March and August, 2001, we contacted 60 regulatory agencies around the world. We ultimately received responses from 45 countries ( Table 2 ). The result is an extensive database containing 178 variables on regulatory governance and content in 45 countries towards the end of 2001. Not all 45 respondents answered all questions, of course, meaning that the sample size for any given question is typically less than 45. Nonetheless, the survey provides detailed, consistent, comparable data at a level of detail not available before. Appendix 1 contains the survey instrument. The survey asked a variety of questions on many aspects of governance and content. On governance, respondents provided information on the precise laws affecting the regulatory agency and regulations, as well as several measures of independence, transparency, accountability, capacity, and competency. On regulatory content, respondents provided information on licenses (wireline, wireless, and internet), interconnection, price regulation, and universal service obligations and funding mechanisms. Finally, the survey collected limited information on the state of the sector, including whether and when the incumbent was privatized, and the number of mobile, wireline, and Internet Service Provider licenses applied for, awarded, and active.
Consider, for example, regulatory independence. As discussed above, the survey included various questions on different aspects of independence. One measure of independence is how the regulatory agency is funded. An agency may be less independent if it relies on government allocations. Figure 1 shows how countries tend to finance their regulators. The data show that regulatory agencies tend to receive their budgets either entirely through fees or entirely from a government allocation. Another measure of independence is the direct power the chief executive (typically, the president or prime minister) has over the regulator and regulations. Figure 2 reveals that in slightly more than half the sample countries the chief executive can fire the regulator, while in about 40 percent of the countries the executive can veto the regulators' decisions.
Figure 2: Regulatory independence
The survey also contains information on regulatory content. Countries commonly regulate prices, for example. These figures show merely a small snapshot of data available from the survey. These data, especially when combined with other, publicly-available, data on the telecommunications sector, should provide new insights into the interactions between regulation and sector performance. 
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The survey of electricity regulators
Electricity reforms have not proceeded as quickly as have telecommunications reforms. It proved more difficult to identify regulatory agencies and to elicit responses from the agencies we identified. Our survey of electricity regulators therefore has fewer observations than does the survey of telecommunications regulators. In the summer of 2001, we identified and contacted 46 regulators by email, fax, and regular mail. We followed up with faxes and telephone calls, and by April 2002 received 20 responses (Table 3) . Breaking responses into their individual components yields a dataset of 20 observations and 374 variables. As in the telecommunications survey, not all regulators responded to all questions, so not all variables exist for each observation. Appendix 2 provides the complete questionnaire.
Table 3: Countries included in electricity survey
In addition to governance questions of the sort described above, we asked regulatory content questions tailored to the electricity sector. For example, the survey inquires about the state of unbundling of transmission, generation, and distribution. Questions regarding competition, too, are specific to the electricity sector, asking, for example, whether choice of electricity supplier is restricted to consumers of some minimum size -common in early stages of electricity reforms.
Consider the general structure of the industry. The survey asks whether the industry remains a vertically integrated monopoly, whether there is any wholesale competition, and whether supply and retail competition exists. Figure 4 shows that while only about onequarter of the countries in the sample retain completely vertically-integrated electricity companies, competition is not especially advanced: slightly more than half allow wholesale competition, but only around 15 percent allow retail competition. Figure 6 shows survey results regarding the type of regulation countries use to regulate transmission and distribution prices. Of the countries that regulate transmission prices, six use price caps, three use revenue caps, and five use rate of return. Of the countries that regulate distribution prices, nine use price caps, two use revenue caps, and five use rate of return regulation.
Like the telecommunications database, the survey data on electricity should provide new and unique insights into the interactions between regulations and the development of the electricity sector. While the sample of countries in the electricity database is smaller than the telecommunications database, consistent and detailed cross-country electricity data is especially scarce, increasing the value of the data despite the small sample. 
Conclusion
The telecommunications and electricity regulation databases are the product of an effort to generate systematic, rigorous, cross-country data on regulations and regulatory agencies in developing countries. The figures presented here provide just a glimpse of the sort of information in the dataset. The myriad data should allow researchers to begin to explore how different types of regulatory governance and content interact with telecommunications and electricity reforms to affect the development of the industry. While these data do not approach the quality and quantity of data available for regulated industries in industrialized countries, they provide information at a level of detail and for a number of countries not available before. We hope these datasets can contribute substantively to the ongoing reforms of network industries and the debate surrounding the optimal structure of these industries.
APPENDIX 1 Telecommunications Regulation Survey
We are researching the impact of the privatization and liberalization process in the telecommunications sector of emerging economies around the world, and your country has been included for this study.
We kindly request you to fill the attached questionnaire in order to build a database of various telecommunications indicators as part of the study. The questionnaire deals with the following topics: 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP
APPENDIX 2 Electricity Regulation Survey
Dear Sir/Madame, As part of our ongoing World Bank Policy Research Report on Infrastructure Regulation, we are conducting a survey of international experience with electricity sector reform. We would like to include your country in this study.
We kindly request you to take a few moments to fill in the attached questionnaire. Our survey covers the following topics: We would welcome any additional material that you may find useful for the purpose of this study. If you have any questions please feel free to contact us.
Questionnaire for Electricity Regulators
Please circle or place a cross in front of the relevant answer(s) when there are multiple choices.
Section 1. Electricity Law
Has the parliament passed any framework laws aiming at reforming the electricity sector? …………………………………. Yes Go to 1.2
No Go to Section 2 1.1 Please list names, years of publication and numbers for relevant laws, including laws related to privatization or investment that affect the electricity sector. 
1._________ ______________________________________________________
---------------------------------------- Incompetence--------------------------------------------------------------------- Corruption--------------------------------------------------------------------------
